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The central purpose of the present research is to examine the ability of social value
orientation (i.e., prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientation), as measured
with methods rooted in game theory (i.e., decomposed games), to predict real-life pro-
social behavior. Consistent with hypotheses, results revealed that individual differences
in social value orientation are predictive of various donations. Relative to individualists
and competitors, prosocials reported to engage in a greater number of donations,
especially donations to organizations aimed at helping the poor and the ill. Results
are discussed in terms of theory and methodology regarding the individual differences
in social value orientation, as well as in terms of societal implications for enhancing
donations to noble causes.
Throughout the past several decades, issues relevant to
prosocial behavior, such as cooperation and compe-
tition, have been thoroughly examined using experi-
mental games. This tradition of research, which is
theoretically and methodologically rooted in game
theory (i.e., Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944), has contributed enormously to
our understanding of the cognitive and motivational
underpinnings of cooperation and competition in dyads
and small groups. For example, the value of reciprocity
and generosity in the evolution of cooperation in dyadic
interaction, the benefits of communication and efficacy
in small group interaction, and the psychological
differences between interpersonal and intergroup inter-
actions have been illuminated in past research using
experimental games (e.g., Komorita & Parks, 1995).
Notwithstanding its important contribution to our
understanding of cooperation and competition, the
experimental game approach can be characterized by
two broad limitations. A first limitation is largely theor-
etical in nature. As a foundation for theory and analysis,
the experimental game approach is based on the
assumption of rational self-interest, arguing that people
tend to pursue their personal well-being, with little or
no regard for other people’s well-being. This assumption
is widespread in several sciences, particularly economics
and political science (cf. public choice theories, econ-
omic man theories; e.g., Olson, 1965; for a review and
discussion, see Mansbridge, 1990), but has been recon-
sidered, complemented, and extended by several psycho-
logical or interpersonal approaches to cooperation and
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competition. A case in point is interdependence theory,
which explicitly assumes that social interaction needs
to be understood in terms of not only concern with
own outcomes (i.e., self-interest), but also broader social
or interpersonal concerns, such as concern with joint
outcomes, concern with partner’s outcomes, and con-
cern with equality in outcomes (e.g., Kelley & Thibaut,
1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Van Lange, De
Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007).
A second limitation is largely methodological in
nature. Experimental games are ‘‘strongly controlled’’
situations that do not tend to capture a psychological
richness that is assumed to be present in real-life situa-
tions. This lack of mundane realism has been acknowl-
edged and recognized for a long time, and several
theorists and researchers have suggested the importance
of bridging the gap between ‘‘games’’ and more ‘‘mun-
dane’’ or everyday forms of interpersonal behaviors.
For example, after reviewing thirty years of research
on experimental games, Pruitt and Kimmel (1977)
underlined the need and importance of studies which
‘‘take us well beyond the gaming laboratory’’ allowing
us ‘‘to assess how far each research finding can be
pushed in explaining other social behavior’’ (p. 387).
Similar or even stronger recommendations have been
advanced in more recent reviews (e.g., Allison, Beggan,
& Midgley, 1996; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Van Vugt,
Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000). Despite these recommenda-
tions, the empirical literature on the ecological validity
of experimental games, or specific tools rooted in this
long tradition of research, is remarkably small.
The current research seeks to examine the ability of
individual differences in social value orientation, assessed
with experimental games, to predict various everyday
life forms of prosocial behavior. Specifically, we seek
to illuminate the ability of social value orientation to
predict various donations. Theoretically, the concept
of social value orientation extends the ‘‘rational self-
interest’’ postulate by assuming that individuals system-
atically differ in their interpersonal preferences, with
some seeking to enhance joint outcomes and equality
in outcomes (prosocial orientation), and others seeking
to enhance their own outcomes in absolute terms (indi-
vidualistic orientation) or comparative terms (competi-
tive orientation). Methodologically, the concept of
social value orientation is rooted in the experimental
game approach, assessing individuals’ preferences by a
series of allocation tasks, or more precisely, a series of
decomposed games, which represent outcomes for self
and outcomes for another (cf. Messick & McClintock,
1968; Pruitt, 1967). As such, the present research
extends past research on prosocial attitudes and disposi-
tions that used instruments not rooted in game
theory, and that examined forms of prosocial behavior
other than donations, such as citizenship behavior in
organizations (e.g., Rioux & Penner, 2001) and volun-
teerism (e.g., Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; see also
Eisenberg, Guthrie, Cumberland, Murphy, Shepard,
Zhou, & Carlo, 2002).
Beyond Self-Interest
Theoretically, the concept of social value orientation is
embedded in interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut,
1978; for a recent review, see Van Lange et al., 2007),
which places particular emphasis on transformations
from so-called given matrices to effective matrices. The
given matrix represents the immediate, hedonistic out-
comes that can be obtained in a given matrix or given
situation (e.g., whether one prefers going to movie X
or Y), whereas the effective matrix represents broader
interaction goals, such as a strong concern with other’s
outcomes, or an attempt at attaining cooperative inter-
action from which one benefits now and in the future.
Of particular relevance to social value orientations is
the concept of outcome transformation, which empha-
sizes the idea that individuals evaluate actions not only
in terms of the quality of one’s own outcomes but also
in terms of the quality of another person’s outcomes.
Prosocial orientation is defined in terms of enhancing
own and other’s outcomes (i.e., maximizing joint out-
comes, MaxJoint) as well as equality in outcomes (i.e.,
minimizing absolute differences in outcomes for self
and another person, MinDiff); individualistic orien-
tation is defined in terms of enhancing outcomes for self,
and being largely indifferent to outcomes for another
person (MaxOwn), and competitive orientation is
defined in terms of enhancing the difference between
outcomes for self and other in favor of themselves
(i.e., maximizing relative outcomes, MaxRel; Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978). A complementary conceptualization of
social value orientation focuses on the similarities and
differences among the three basic orientations, noting
that (a) all three orientations seek to enhance outcomes
for self (similarity), (b) unlike individualism and compe-
tition, prosocial orientation seeks to enhance both out-
comes for another person (as part of enhancing joint
outcomes) and equality in outcomes (i.e., a prosocial
versus proself difference), and (c) unlike prosocials and
individualists, competitors seek to minimize outcomes
for another person as part of enhancing relative advan-
tage over another’s outcomes (see Knight & Dubro,
1984; Van Lange, 1999).
The concept of social value orientation is rooted in
classic research on cooperation and competition, which
revealed (largely unexpected, as noted by McClintock,
1972) a good deal of within-individual consistency in
behavior over a series of interactions and across
situations. These considerations, as well as the aim of
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disentangling (or decomposing) interpersonal goals
underlying behavior in experimental games, have
inspired researchers to design a measure that is closely
linked to game behavior (Messick & McClintock,
1986; Pruitt, 1967). Rather than focusing on a 2 by 2
matrix game, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game,
the instrument represents ‘‘decompositions’’ of game
situations, capturing consequences of one’s behavior
for oneself and another person. A frequently-used
instrument is the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social
Values (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997;
see also earlier research by Messick & McClintock,
1968; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). In this instrument
(see Appendix 1), outcomes are presented in terms of
points said to be valuable to self and the other, and
the other person is described as someone they do not
know and that they will never knowingly meet in the
future (in an effort to exclude the role of considerations
relevant to the future interactions).
An example of a decomposed game is the choice
among three options:
(1) Option A: 480 points for self and 80 points for
other;
(2) Option B: 540 points for self and 280 points for
other; and
(3) Option C: 480 points for self and 480 points for
other.
In this example, Option A represents the competitive
choice, because it yields the greatest outcomes for self
relative to the other (480–80 ¼ 400 points); Option B
represents the individualistic choice, because it yields
the greatest absolute outcomes for self (540 points),
and Option C represents the prosocial choice because
it yields the greatest joint outcomes (480þ 480 ¼ 960)
as well as the smallest absolute difference between out-
comes for self and other (480–480 ¼ 0 points). In
research using this instrument, most individuals are
classified as prosocial (about 60–65%), followed by indi-
vidualists (about 25%), and only a small minority is
classified as competitive (about 10–15%). Of course,
these percentages might differ as a function of the sam-
ple, depending on variables such as (sub)cultural differ-
ences (e.g., Madsen & Lancy, 1981; Parks & Vu, 1994),
gender, number of siblings, and age (Van Lange et al.,
1997).
Consistent with earlier modeling and theorizing
(Messick & McClintock, 1968; McClintock, 1972),
research revealed that social value orientation exhibited
considerable ability to predict actual behavior in a var-
iety of different experiment games, with prosocials exhi-
biting greater cooperation than individualists and
competitors (e.g., McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). More-
over, social value orientations often exert their influence
not only in terms of statistical main effects, but also in
interaction with a number of variables, such as person-
ality impressions of the partner, the behavioral strategy
pursued by the interaction partner, and the features of
the interdependence structure of the social dilemma
(e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello,
1975; Sattler & Kerr, 1991). Finally, within the realm
of experimental games, social value orientation is asso-
ciated with a number of cognitive processes, including
the use of morality (good versus bad) versus competence
(intelligent versus stupid, weak versus strong) in person
judgment and impression formation (De Bruin & Van
Lange, 2000; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre,
1986), the priming of such constructs (e.g., Smeesters,
Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003),
the use and recall of prosocial versus self-serving heuris-
tics in negotiation (De Dreu & Boles, 1998), the strategic
use of fairness in bargaining (Van Dijk, De Cremer, &
Handgraaf, 2004), response latencies for making deci-
sions in experimental games (Dehue, McClintock, &
Liebrand, 1993), and evaluations of structural solutions
to social dilemmas (e.g., Samuelson, 1993).
Beyond Experimental Games
Is there evidence in support of the predictive ability of
social value orientation regarding behavior in situations
other than experimental games or social dilemmas tasks
administered in the laboratory? Research by Bem and
Lord (1979) has revealed that prosocials, individualists,
and competitors were described differently by their
friends and roommates—for example, prosocials tended
to be viewed as relatively more moralistic, fastidious,
and concerned with philosophical problems. Moreover,
there is research on judgments of commuting situations,
revealing that prosocials tend to construe such situations
in terms of collective welfare (environmental conse-
quences; e.g., how much does the car versus train pollute
the environment?) whereas individualists and competi-
tors tend to construe such situations in terms of personal
welfare (e.g., travel time e.g., Joireman, Van Lange,
Kuhlman, Shelley, & Van Vugt, 1997; Van Vugt,
Meertens, Van Lange, 1995). Also, in the context of
organizations, prosocials indicate a stronger concern
with the goals of other departments than do individual-
ists and competitors (Nauta, De Dreu, & Van der Vaart,
2002). Thus, there is evidence suggesting that social
value orientation is associated with judgments of specific
situations with which they are faced outside of the lab-
oratory. Also, there is only one study that has directly
examined the predictive ability of social value orien-
tation regarding prosocial behavior. McClintock and
Allison (1989) classified a large number of students in
terms of their social value orientation, and mailed them
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a request to volunteer zero to ten hours of their time to
serve as a participant in research at the University of
California Santa Barbara (i.e., students were told that
such participation in experiments is important to
maintaining the university’s standard of excellence in
research). Although social value orientation was not
predictive of whether or not they returned their
responses forms, it did appear that prosocials donated
significantly more hours than did individualists or com-
petitors. Thus, the extant literature on the predictive
ability of social value orientation regarding everyday
forms of prosocial behavior is rather limited.
The present study examines the associations of social
value orientation with (a) specific donation acts (e.g.,
transferring money on a bank account, buying lottery
tickets) that they had enacted in the past year, and with
(b) global donation goals, which were assessed by asking
to which organizations they had made a donation in the
past year. The examination of the specific donation acts
illuminates the specific ways in which people may
donate, whereas the examination of the global donation
goals illuminate the social motivation underlying dona-
tions—for example, individuals are likely to benefit
from donations to organizations that support the local
sports club, but are unlikely to benefit (at least in a
tangible manner) from donations to organizations that
support third world countries. We hypothesized that
prosocials would engage in a greater number of
donation acts than individualists and competitors. And
in a more exploratory vein, we examined whether the
predicted link between social value orientation and
donations may to some degree depend on the primary
goals of the organizations to which these donations
are made.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 991 individuals participated in this study. This
sample constitutes individuals who have agreed to par-
ticipate once every week in surveys and research con-
ducted by NIPO (the Netherlands Institute for the
assessment of Public Opinion), an organization of com-
puterized survey research. In exchange, each participant
receives a personal computer that is also being employed
for surveys and research. This personal computer is con-
nected with the main computer at NIPO where the data
are stored automatically. The sample consisted of more
men (76%) than women (24%), included participants
from differing age categories: 34 years or younger
(22.0%), 35 through 54 years (43.4%), and 55 years
and older (34.6%), with 28.0% having an annual income
less than 28.000 guilders (about 14.000 US dollars) and
9.9% higher than 99.000 guilders (about 49.500 US dol-
lars) at the time the studys was conducted, and 47% had
followed and completed an education that is considered
to be mid-level or higher education in the Netherlands.1
Procedure
The questionnaire, administered via a computer, con-
sisted of a series of nine decomposed games. However,
given that the sample includes individuals with less edu-
cation than university students, we wanted to assess
whether participants were able to make a decision in
the decomposed games. Hence, in addition to prosocial,
individualistic, and competitive choices, we included the
option ‘‘I do not know.’’ It appeared that 40 parti-
cipants (4%) indicated lack of comprehension or
decision difficulty by choosing the ‘‘I do not know’’
category in at least one of the decomposed games. As
in previous research, participants were categorized as
prosocial, individualistic, or competitive if they made
six or more choices that were consistent with that
orientation (see McClintock & Allison, 1989; Van Lange
et al., 1997). According to these criteria, we identified
588 prosocials (70%), 172 individualists (20%), and 81
competitors (10%). One hundred and fifty participants
could not be reliably classified because they made fewer
than six consistent choices.
Donation questionnaire. The questionnaire included
12 questions focusing on specific donation acts, asking
participants whether they engaged in a particular act
of donation in the past year (‘‘yes’’ versus ‘‘no’’). We
generated a wide variety of different donation acts,
including the variety of places where individuals may
donate (e.g., in a church, at a market or fancy fair, in
a shop), as well as the specific acts by which they donate
(e.g., supporting a race, buying lottery tickets, donation
of used clothes to charity). These twelve donation acts
capture a great variety of ways in which people in the
Netherlands make donations.
The questionnaire included eight categories of orga-
nizations to which individuals may make financial dona-
tions. These organizations, which are indicative of broad
donation goals, are are (a) third world organizations, (b)
charity organizations, (c) health organizations, (d)
environmental organizations (including protection of
animals), (e) church or related organizations, (f) sports=
recreation organizations, (g) organizations for the advance-
ment of education and research, and (h) organizations
1Women were underrepresented because the sample used by NIPO
consisted of many couples. We wished to avoid that both partners
would participate (i.e., to obtain ‘‘independent’’ responses) and
therefore asked one of them to complete the survey. It appeared
than among these couples much more men than women decided to
participate.
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for the advancement of art and culture. These eight
donations are based on national surveys conducted in
the USA (‘‘Giving USA’’) and Great Britain (‘‘Individ-
ual Giving and Volunteering in Britain’’), which have
been extended to the Netherlands (i.e., ‘‘Giving in the
Netherlands’’; described in Schuyt, 1997). Participants
were asked whether they had donated to each of the
eight organizations in the past year (e.g., Did you
donate in the past year money to ‘‘third world organi-
zations,’’ ‘‘health organizations,’’ and so on).
RESULTS
Donation Acts
To test the hypothesis that prosocials would be more
likely to donate in a variety of ways than individualists
and competitors, we computed the number of donation
acts (out of twelve donation acts) individuals engaged
in during the past year. A one-way analysis of variance
with planned comparisons for the three social value
orientations, revealed a significant contrast of prosocials
versus individualists and competitors, F(1, 838) ¼ 30.17,
p < .001, d ¼ .38; the contrast of individualists and
competitors was not significant, F(1, 838) ¼ 0.23, ns.
In support of the present hypothesis, prosocials,
M ¼ 6.11, SD ¼ 2.64, engaged in a greater number of
donations than did individualists, M ¼ 4.95,
SD ¼ 2.70, or competitors, M ¼ 5.12, SD ¼ 2.68.
Next, we examined the association between social
value orientation and each donation act. As can be seen
in Table 1, prosocials were more likely than either
individualists or competitors to engage in acts such as
‘‘donating used clothes in clothes containers’’ (item #3),
‘‘being a registered contributor’’ (item #5), and ‘‘buy-
ing something in a third world shop or environment
shop’’ (item #12). These effects were accompanied with
only ‘‘reasonable’’ effect sizes, given that each specific
donation act should be determined by a host of vari-
ables (such as whether encounter these opportunities,
social norms, age) along with random error (i.e., such
random error is less strong for the mean number of
donation acts, as it more strongly averages out random
error). At the same time, associations of social value
orientation and donation were not especially strong
when donations were linked to religion or church
(items #6 and #8), and absent for donating on the
street (item #7). While consistent with our hypothesis,
many or most of these donation acts represent not only
a specific means for making a contribution, but also a
particular goal that one seeks to pursue. For example,
donating used clothes presumably contributes to the
well-being of poor people. In the next analysis, we
TABLE 1
Percentages of Specific Donations Among Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors
Social Value Orientation
Prosocials Individualists Competitors Total
Chi(2)
(N ¼ 841)
Effect Size
(Phi)
Did you donate in the past year money or goods through:
1. a solicitation at home 91.5b 82.6a 88.9ab 89.4 11.26
 .11
2. buying lottery tickets for a good cause 72.3b 67.4b 55.6a 69.7 9.94
 .11
3. alternative means of giving (e.g. donating used clothes in clothes
containers)
63.9b 49.4a 49.4a 59.6 15.52
 .14
4. financially supporting someone in his=her actions for a good cause
(e.g., a race)
56.1b 43.0a 48.1ab 52.7 9.90
 .11
5. being a registered contributor (e.g., foster parents) involving per-
iodic donation of money via a bank or other financial institution
52.6b 37.8a 38.3a 48.2 15.12
 .13
6. a collection in a church 47.1a 39.5a 53.1a 46.1 4.81
þ .07
7. a collection on the street 42.5a 40.1a 37.0a 41.5 1.05 .08
8. a regular contribution to church, mosque, or humanistic organiza-
tion
41.7b 33.1a 42.0ab 40.0 4.19 .07
9. buying something for a good cause (e.g., at the door or through a
friend or acquaintance)
37.6b 28.5a 29.6ab 35.0 5.96
 .08
10. a personal letter along with a bank transcript 36.1b 27.9a 22.2a 33.1 8.75
 .10
11. buying something at a charity event (‘‘fancy fair’’ or flee market) 34.9a 25.6a 24.7a 32.0 7.46
 .09
12. buying something in a ‘‘third world shop’’ or ‘‘environment shop’’ 34.4b 20.3a 23.5a 30.4 14.39
 .13
Note: Donations are listed in decreasing order of prevalence. The data of five participants were discarded due to missing values. Percentages with
different subscripts per column differ significantly from each other in a pairwise comparison with df ¼ 1. In these comparisons, we computed tests of
different frequencies regarding any of the three pairs of social value orientation (prosocials vs. individualists; prosocials vs. competitors; individualists
vs. competitors) in their ‘‘yes or no’’ responses to specific donation acts in the past year.
þp < .10, marginal; p < .05; p < .01; p < .001.
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examine donation goals with no reference to the spe-
cific means that individuals use to make a donation.
Donation Goals
To test the hypothesis whether prosocials would pursue
a greater variety of donation goals (i.e., donating to a
greater number of organizations) than individualists
and competitors, we computed the number of donations
goals (out of eight donations in total) individuals
engaged in during the past year. A one-way analysis of
variance with planned comparisons revealed a signifi-
cant contrast of prosocials versus individualists and
competitors, F(1, 820) ¼ 14.06, p < .001, d ¼ .26, as
well as a significant contrast of individualists and com-
petitors, F(1, 820) ¼ 6.00, p < .05, d ¼ .17. Consistent
with our hypothesis, prosocials, M ¼ 3.37, SD ¼ 1.85,
pursued a greater number of donation goals than did
individualists, M ¼ 3.03, SD ¼ 2.13, or competitors,
M ¼ 2.39, SD ¼ 1.71. The significance of the second
contrast reveals that individualists tended to pursue a
greater number of donation goals than did competitors.
The associations among social value orientation and
eight different donations are presented in Table 2 (the
fifth column reports the Chi2s as well as their levels of
significance by asterisks, and effect sizes). Four of eight
associations were significant, and one association was
marginal (i.e., donations to environmental organiza-
tions). Interestingly, there was a fairly linear decrease
in the percentages among prosocials, individualists,
and competitors for donations regarding international
support (item #3) and societal and charity goals (item
#5). One might assume that these two types of dona-
tions are most strongly linked to helping others who
need such help. And it is unlikely that individuals who
donate to such causes anticipate any tangible outcomes
for themselves by doing so. In contrast, it is possible for
contributors to benefit (at least in the long run) from
donations to ‘‘church or related organizations’’ (item
#4), ‘‘education and research’’ (item #6), ‘‘sport and
recreation’’ (item #8), or ‘‘art and culture’’ (item #7),
and the three former causes did not yield significant
associations with social value orientation.2
DISCUSSION
The present findings provide good support for the gen-
eral claim that, relative to individualists and competi-
tors, prosocials engage in a greater variety of donation
acts, and pursue a greater number of donation goals.
Individual differences in social value orientation appear
to be especially predictive of donations to organizations
aimed at helping others who are strongly dependent on
such help—people who are poor and people who are ill.
TABLE 2
Percentages of Donations to Different Organizations For Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors
Social Value Orientation
Prosocials Individualists Competitors Total Chi(2) (N ¼ 823) Effect Size (Phi)
Did you donate in the past year money to:
1. Health organizations 72.5b 69.7b 57.1a 70.5 7.73
 .10
2. Environmental organizations 58.9b 54.5ab 45.5a 56.7 5.39
þ .08
3. Third world organizations 52.3c 41.8b 20.8a 47.3 29.60
 .19
4. Church or related organizations 47.2b 38.8a 42.9ab 45.1 3.81 .07
5. Charity and societal organizations 46.6b 38.8ab 32.5a 43.7 7.61
 .09
6. Sport=recreation organizations 33.4a 27.3a 26.0a 31.5 3.42 .06
7. Education=research organizations 14.6b 18.2a 11.7a 15.1 2.02 .05
8. Art=culture organizations 11.5b 13.9b 2.6a 11.2 7.05
 .09
Note: Donations are listed in decreasing order of prevalence. The data of 23 participants were discarded due to missing values. Percentages with
different subscripts per column differ significantly from each other in a pairwise comparison with df ¼ 1. In these comparisons, we computed tests of
different frequencies regarding any of the three pairs of social value orientation (prosocials vs. individualists; prosocials vs. competitors; individualists
vs. competitors) in their ‘‘yes or no’’ responses to each of the ‘‘donation goals’’ in the past year.
þp < .10, marginal; p < .05; p < .01; p < .001.
2We also examined the associations of level of education and age
with the number of donation acts and number of donation goals. Con-
sistent with previous research (e.g., Midlarsky, 1991; see also Dovidio
et al., 2006), we found that level of education and age were positively
associated with the number of donation acts, as well as with the number
of donation goals. Also, we found that relative to women, men exhib-
ited a greater number of donation acts and donation goals. However,
after testing the effects of these variables, regression analyses revealed
that the contrast of prosocial versus individualists and competitors
remained significant, for number donation acts and number of
donation goals (both ps < .001). Given its theoretical and empirical sig-
nificance, we also explored interaction effects of social value orientation
and age in their associations with specific donation acts and donation
goals. Out of a total of 20 tests (for 12 donations acts and 8 donation
goals), none appeared to be significant (with p < .05). These analyses
support the relatively independent role of social value orientation in
predicting number of donation acts and number of donation goals.
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These findings have important theoretical and methodo-
logical implications for the construct of social value
orientation, several of which we discuss below.
To begin with, past research on social value orienta-
tions has tended to focus on (a) experimental games, to
study (b) cognition, behavior, and interactions in dyads,
and to a lesser extent, small groups. In fact, it is
noteworthy that the assessment of social value orien-
tation focuses on allocation of outcomes between the
self and another person (rather than other persons, or
a group of other persons). As such, the present research
complements the broad literature on social value orien-
tation in three important respects. First, it supports the
predictive ability of social value orientation in situa-
tions, which are substantially different from experi-
mental social dilemmas and related ‘‘game situations.’’
Second, it supports its predictive ability in situations
involving millions of people that are not part of one’s
own group—contexts in which, for example, direct
reciprocity do not really matter. Third, by examining
the link between social value orientation and prosocial
behavior, the present research also contributes to our
understanding of the broad motivations that may under-
lie prosocial behavior. As noted earlier, the primary dif-
ferences between prosocials versus individualists and
competitors focus on two complementary goals: enhanc-
ing another person’s outcomes and enhancing equality
in outcomes (see Knight & Dubro, 1984; Van Lange,
1999). Hence, we suggest that the observed differences
in the various forms of prosocial behavior could, in
principle, be distally explained by these two broad goals.
Prosocials may be more likely to donate in an attempt to
enhance the well-being of the poor and the sick because
they are concerned not only with helping others, but
also with seeking fairness by making a contribution to
improving the outcomes for those who are less well off
(e.g., the poor and the ill).
Given that experimental games have been criticized
for lacking mundane realism (i.e., using a methodology
focusing on ‘‘points’’ and ‘‘hypothetical others’’), it
becomes important to ask why such measurement is able
to predict prosocial behavior in the real world. We sug-
gest two interrelated benefits. One benefit may be that
the decomposed game approach follows the logic of
‘‘forced-choice’’ methodology, in which the prosocial,
individualistic, and competitive options are pitted
against each other. Such choice-related measures (see
Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) measures may provide a useful
complement to measures focusing on language and self-
ratings, because frequently prosocial behavior in the real
world is about making choices (e.g., whether to help
others versus save time for oneself, whether to donate
money or save money for oneself). A second benefit
may glean from the fact that the experimental game
methodology does not rely very strongly on language,
in that it focuses on allocation of points. We regard
this to be especially important in the domain of proso-
cial (and selfish) behavior, because self-evaluations
regarding such issues tend to be sensitive to social desir-
ability in responding. That is, alternative measurement
techniques that rely more strongly on language (e.g.,
an item asking ‘‘do you consider yourself selfish?’’)
may be more sensitive to social desirability, because of
the strong evaluative connotations of concepts such as
selfishness, cooperation, and competition. The fact that
the assessment of social value orientation takes only a
couple of minutes, is unrelated to instruments assessing
tendencies to socially desirable responding (see Van
Lange, Agnew et al., 1997), and can be fruitfully used
in samples other than convenience samples underscores
the notion that games are ‘‘easy to employ and economi-
cal’’ (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977, p. 366) and hence of great
practical utility for a variety of scientific and societal
purposes.
From a societal perspective, we wish to underline the
importance of donations, as the world’s well-being con-
tinues to be strongly dependent on the generosity of
individuals, organizations, states and nations. As such,
it was interesting to see that social value orientation
was strongly associated with donations to ‘‘third world
organizations,’’ with 52% of prosocials, 42% of indivi-
dualists, and 21% of competitors having donated in
the past year. Hence, it is surprising that differences in
social value orientation have received virtually no
empirical attention in research on very ‘‘noble’’ forms
of prosocial behavior, which are unlikely to be
accounted for by mechanisms underlying long-term
self-interest—which in fact have received a lot of atten-
tion in past research. Also, from a societal perspective,
the present findings raise the possibility that donations
may be enhanced not only by interventions emphasizing
empathy (e.g., to enhance concern for other’s well-
being) but also by interventions emphasizing fairness
(e.g., to enhance equality in outcomes).
Before closing, we wish to comment on two limita-
tions of the present research. First, the present research
relied on self-report methodology. Even though social
value orientation has demonstrated to be independent
of instruments assessing tendencies to social desirability,
and even though the measurement of social value orien-
tation and donation was separated by several unrelated
questionnaires (included by other researchers), we can-
not exclude the (remote) possibility that such tendencies
have affected the present findings. Second, although the
present research may illuminate the broad motivations
that could underlie various forms of prosocial behavior,
we provided very little insight into the more specific
proximal mechanisms underlying the observed differ-
ences between prosocials versus individualists and com-
petitors. For example, relative to individualists and
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competitors, prosocials may have a stronger need to feel
good about themselves, a stronger sense of moral
obligation, derive greater esteem, pride, or respect from
prosocial behaviors, have a stronger desire to uphold a
moral principle, or may be more aversive to interperso-
nal conflicts, friction, and hostility, more likely to
empathize with others’ distress, suffering, and pain, or
any combination of these (e.g., Batson, 1998; Penner,
Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Dovidio, Piliavin,
Schroeder, & Penner, 2006).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Game theory has provided a powerful logic and analysis
that has bridged several scientific disciplines in their pur-
suit of understanding cooperation and conflict resol-
ution among individuals, groups, and nations (see Van
Lange, 2006). Although game theory was designed in
part to understand major societal issues such as inter-
national conflict, virtually no attempt has been made
to test the utility of experimental games—the tool pro-
vided by game theory—to predict behavior or outcomes
that are of direct societal interest. The present research
helps to bridge the gap between (game) theory and prac-
tice by indicating that tools rooted in game theory (i.e.,
decomposed games) are efficient and effective at predict-
ing behaviors that help improve the conditions of those
people who need it the most.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Parts of this research was presented at the General
Meeting of the European Association of Experimental
Social Psychology (Wu¨rzburg, Germany, July 2005).
The research was supported by a grant to Paul Van
Lange from the Netherlands Organization of Scientific
Research (NWO; Grant No. R-57-178). We are grateful
to Johan Karremans for providing helpful comments on
an earlier version of this article.
REFERENCES
Allison, S. T., Beggan, J. K., & Midgley, E. H. (1996). The quest for
‘‘similar instances’’ and ‘‘simultaneous possibilities’’: Metaphors in
social dilemma research. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 71, 479–497.
Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. T.
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The Handbook of Social
Psychology (pp. 282–316). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Bem, D. J., & Lord, C. G. (1979). Template matching: A proposal for
probing the ecological validity of experimental settings in social psy-
chology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 833–846.
Colman, A. M. (1995). Game Theory and Its Applications in the Social
and Biological Sciences. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
De Bruin, E. N. M., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2000). What people look
for in others: Influences of the perceiver and the perceived on
information selection. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
26, 206–219.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Boles, T. L. (1998). Share and share alike or
winner take all? The influence of social value orientation upon
choice and recall of negotiation heuristics. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 76, 253–276.
Dehue, F. M. J., McClintock, C. G., & Liebrand, W. B. G. (1993).
Social value related response latencies: Unobtrusive evidence for
individual differences in information processing. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 23, 273–294.
Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., Schroeder, D. A., & Penner, L. A.
(2006). The Social Psychology of Prosocial Behavior. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Eisenberg, N., Guthrie, I. K., Cumberland, A., Murphy, B. C.,
Shepard, S. A., Zhou, Q., & Carlo, G. (2002). Prosocial develop-
ment in early adulthood: A longitudinal study. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 82, 993–1006.
Joireman, J. A., Van Lange, P. A. M., Kuhlman, D. M., Van Vugt, M.,
& Shelley, G. P. (1997). An interdependence analysis of commuting
decisions. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 441–463.
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of
cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91.
Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations: A
theory of interdependence. New York: Wiley.
Knight, G. P., & Dubro, A. F. (1984). Cooperative, competitive, and
individualistic social values: An individualized regression and
clustering approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
46, 98–105.
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1995). Interpersonal relations: Mixed-
motive interaction. Annual Review of Psychology, 46, 183–207.
Kuhlman, D. M., Camac, C., & Cunha, D. A. (1986). Individual dif-
ferences in social orientation. In H. Wilke, D. Messick, & C. Rutte
(Eds.), Experimental Social Dilemmas (pp. 151–176). New York:
Verlag.
Kuhlman, D. M., & Marshello, A. (1975). Individual differences in
game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategic effects
in prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
32, 922–931.
Liebrand, W. B. G., Jansen, R. W. T. L., Rijken, V. M., & Suhre, C. J.
M. (1986). Might over morality: Social values and the perception of
other players in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 22, 203–215.
Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction
and Critical Survey. London: Wiley.
Madsen, M. C., & Lancy, D. F. (1981). Cooperative and competitive
behavior: Experiments related to ethnic identity and urbanization
in Papua New Guinea. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 12,
389–408.
Mansbridge, J. J. (Ed.). (1990). Beyond Self-Interest. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
McClintock, C. G. (1972). Social motivation – a set of propositions.
Behavioral Science, 17, 438–454.
McClintock, C. G., & Allison, S. T. (1989). Social value orientation
and helping behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 19,
353–362.
McClintock, C. G., & Liebrand, W. B. G. (1988). The role of interde-
pendence structure, individual value orientation and other’s strategy
in social decision making: A transformational analysis. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 396–409.
382 VAN LANGE ET AL.
Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. G. (1968). Motivational bases of
choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 4, 1–25.
Nauta, A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van der Vaart, T. (2002). Social
value orientation, organizational goal concerns, and interdepart-
mental problem-solving behavior. Journal of Organizational Beha-
vior, 23, 199–213.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Parks, C. D., & Vu, A. D. (1994). Social dilemma behavior of indivi-
duals from highly individualist and collectivist cultures. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 38, 708–718.
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A.
(2005). Prosocial behavior: Multilevel perspectives. Annual Review
of Psychology, 56, 365–392.
Penner, L. A., & Finkelstein, M. A. (1998). Dispositional and structur-
al determinants of volunteerism. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 525–537.
Pruitt, D. G. (1967). Reward structure and cooperation: The decom-
posed prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 7, 21–27.
Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental
gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual
Review of Psychology, 28, 363–392.
Rioux, S. M., & Penner, L. A. (2001). The causes of organizational
citizenship behavior: A motivational analysis. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 86, 1306–1314.
Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). Interdependence,
interaction, and relationships. Annual Review of Psychology, 54,
351–375.
Samuelson, C. D. (1993). A multiattribute evaluation approach to
structural change in resource dilemmas. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 55, 298–324.
Sattler, D. N., & Kerr, N. L. (1991). Might versus morality explored:
Motivational and cognitive bases for social motives. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 756–765.
Schuyt, T. (1997). Geven in Nederland. (Giving in the Netherlands).
Houten, The Netherlands: Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum.
Sheldon, K. M. (1999). Learning the lessons of tit-for-tat: Even com-
petitors can get the message. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 77, 1245–1253.
Smeesters, D., Warlop, L., Van Avermaet, E., Corneille, O., &
Yzerbyt, V. (2003). Do prime hawks with doves: The interplay of
construct activation and consistency of social value orientation on
cooperative behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
84, 972–987.
Snyder, M. (1993). Basic research and practical problems: The promise
of a functional personality and social psychology. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 251–264.
Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2004). Social
value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum
bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40,
697–707.
Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and
equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value
orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
337–349.
Van Lange, P. A. M. (Ed.). (2006). Bridging Social Psychology:
Benefits of Transdisciplinary Approaches. Mahwah: Erlbaum.
Van Lange, P. A. M., De Cremer, D., Van Dijk, E., & Van Vugt, M.
(2007). Self-interest and beyond: Basic principles of social interac-
tion. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds), Social Psychology:
Handbook of Basic Principles (2nd ed., pp. 540–561). New York:
Guilford.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. N. M., & Joireman,
J. A. (1997). Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competi-
tive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 733–746.
Van Vugt, M., Meertens, R. M., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). Car
versus public transportation? The role of social value orientations
in a real-life social dilemma. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
25, 258–278.
Van Vugt, M., Snyder, M., Tyler, T. R., & Biel, A. (2000) (Eds.),
Cooperation in Modern Society. London, Routledge.
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
APPENDIX
An Instrument to Measure Social Value Orientation
In this task we ask you to imagine that you have been
randomly paired with another person, whom we will
refer to simply as the ‘‘Other.’’ This other person is
someone you do not know and that you will not know-
ingly meet in the future. Both you and the ‘‘Other’’ per-
son will be making choices by circling either the letter A,
B, or C. Your own choices will produce points for both
yourself and the ‘‘Other’’ person. Likewise, the other’s
choice will produce points for him=her and for you.
Every point has value: the more points you receive,
the better for you, and the more points the ‘‘Other’’
receives, the better for him=her.
Here’s an example of how this task works:
A B C
You get 500 500 550
Other gets 100 500 300
In this example, if you choose A you would receive
500 points and the other would receive 100 points; if
you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other
500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points
and the other 300. So, you see that your choice influ-
ences both the number of points you receive and the
number of points the other receives. Before you begin
making choices, please keep in mind that there are no
right or wrong answers—choose the option that you,
for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember that
the points have value: the more of them you accumulate
the better for you. Likewise, from the ‘‘other’s’’ point of
view, the more points s=he accumulates, the better for
him=her.
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For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending on which column you prefer most:
A B C A B C
(1) You get 480 540 480 (6) You get 500 500 570
Other gets 80 280 480 Other gets 500 100 300
(2) You get 560 500 500 (7) You get 510 560 510
Other gets 300 500 100 Other gets 510 300 110
(3) You get 520 520 580 (8) You get 550 500 500
Other gets 520 120 320 Other gets 300 100 500
(4) You get 500 560 490 (9) You get 480 490 540
Other gets 100 300 490 Other gets 100 490 300
(5) You get 560 500 490
Other gets 300 500 90
Note: Participants are classified when they make 6 or more consistent choices. Prosocial choices are: 1c 2b 3a 4c 5b 6a 7a
8c 9b; individualistic choices are: 1b 2a 3c 4b 5a 6c 7b 8a 9c; and competitive choices are: 1a 2c 3b 4a 5c 6b 7c 8b 9a.
384 VAN LANGE ET AL.

